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Abstract
Deep neural networks have been shown to be vulnerable
to membership inference attacks wherein the attacker aims
to detect whether specific input data were used to train the
model. These attacks can potentially leak private or propri-
etary data. We present a new extension of Fano’s inequality
and employ it to theoretically establish that the probability of
success for a membership inference attack on a deep neural
network can be bounded using the mutual information be-
tween its inputs and its activations and/or outputs. This en-
ables the use of mutual information to measure the suscepti-
bility of a DNN model to membership inference attacks. In
our empirical evaluation, we show that the correlation be-
tween the mutual information and the susceptibility of the
DNN model to membership inference attacks is 0.966, 0.996,
and 0.955 for CIFAR-10, SVHN and GTSRB models, respec-
tively.
1 Introduction
Deep neural network (DNN) models have achieved remark-
able accuracy levels on tasks such as image classification,
activity recognition, speech translation, autonomous driving,
and medical diagnosis. This has fueled the emergence of a
market for DNN models that could be trained on proprietary
or private data, and then made available to the users either
directly or as a service over cloud platforms. Recently, it has
been shown that black-box access to a DNN model can be
used to detect whether a specific data item is a member of the
training data set. Such membership inference attacks (MIA)
pose a significant security and privacy risk.
The “Dalenius desideratum” (Dwork 2011) was first pro-
posed in the literature on statistical disclosure control and
attempts to characterize this notion of expected privacy for
training data. It states that the model should reveal no more
about the input to which it is applied than would have been
known about this input without applying the model. Another
closely related notion of privacy considers the leak in the
values of sensitive protected attributes of an input by using
the model’s output (Fredrikson et al. 2014). But such ab-
solute notions of privacy for all training inputs cannot be
achieved by any useful model (Dwork and Naor 2010). A
membership inference attack using the neural network’s top
layer output was shown in (Shokri and Shmatikov 2015),
and a recent improvement, by incorporating activation and
gradient output of layers, was proposed in (Nasr, Shokri,
and Houmansadr 2019). Techniques such as those employ-
ing differential privacy during model training have also been
shown to be not immune to privacy attacks without dete-
rioration of the model’s accuracy (Rahman et al. 2018). A
useful model must preserve some information of the train-
ing data to make accurate predictions. The literature on gen-
eralization in deep learning (Zhang et al. 2016; Neyshabur
et al. 2017) studies a closely related problem of understand-
ing whether the model has memorized training data or dis-
tilled a generalized model from it. Some theories of general-
ization in deep learning connect it to the mutual information
between the input and output of the model (Shwartz-Ziv and
Tishby 2017; Xu and Raginsky 2017). We make the follow-
ing contributions in this paper:
• Fano’s inequality establishes an information theoretic
relationship between the average information lost in a
noisy channel and the probability of the categorization er-
ror (Fano 1961). We extend Fano’s inequality to establish
that the probability of success for a membership inference
attack on a deep neural network can be bounded by an ex-
pression that depends on the mutual information between
its inputs and its activations and/or outputs.
• Inspired by our theoretical results, we use the mutual in-
formation between the input and the outputs/activations
of a DNN model as a metric for computing its suscepti-
bility to membership inference attacks (MIA). Our eval-
uation over a set of deep learning benchmarks and mem-
bership attack (Shokri and Shmatikov 2015; Nasr, Shokri,
and Houmansadr 2019) methods demonstrates that mu-
tual information strongly correlates with the success prob-
ability of membership inference attacks. Our experimen-
tal results show that the correlation between the mutual
information and MIA susceptibility is 0.966, 0.996, and
0.955 for CIFAR-10, SVHN and GTSRB data sets.
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Figure 1: The training of a DNN model N uses the dataset D with n d-dimensional inputs Di and corresponding labels Y ci .
An MIA attack method relies on feeding m inputs D′i from D ⊇ D to the trained DNN model N to obtain its probabilistic
predictions/activations. This is, in turn, fed to the MIA model which makes a prediction Ai of whether the data input D′i is
present in D. The ground truth of whether D′i is present in D is denoted by Xi. The output/activations are denoted by Y . The
empirical MIA success probability is computed from the predictions of the MIA model on whether the attacker-provided input
data D′i belong to the training set D. Our derived bound on the attack success probability is computed by estimating the mutual
information between the input and the activation and gradient output of the top layers the DNN modelN . Very high correlation
demonstrates practical utility of our theoretical bound.
2 Result Summary
MIA Attacker Model: We consider an adversary mount-
ing a membership inference attack against a DNN model N
where the adversary can have black-box (Shokri et al. 2017)
or white-box (Nasr, Shokri, and Houmansadr 2019) access
to the target DNN model. It can issue arbitrary queries D′i
and retrieve the model’s prediction Yi. D ⊇ D is the pop-
ulation from which the training dataset D is drawn. The
adversary can obtain the model output Y , which could be
the softmax output in a black-box setting and include the
activation and gradient output of top layers in a white-box
environment. The adversary can access a set of input data
that are drawn independently from that population. The at-
tacker’s inputs D′ might contain only elements of interest to
the attacker for which it wants to infer whether these were
used in training the modelN . The adversary has no other in-
formation about whether these input data are present in the
training set.
Susceptibility of a model to MIA Attack: Given a specific
input Di from a data set D and a neural network N learned
from the training data D ⊆ D, an MIA attack M deter-
mines whether Di ∈ D, i.e. the input Di is present in the
training data set D. Let X = (X0, . . . , Xm) be a random
variable that indicates the ground truth whether the attack
inputs are present in the training data set D. Here, Xi = 1
if the training data set D contains the corresponding data
Di; otherwise Xi = 0. A = (A0, . . . , Am) denotes a ran-
dom variable describing whether an MIA algorithm labels
the data Di as being present in the training set for modelN .
Ai = 1 if the MIA algorithm predicts that the input Di has
been used for training; otherwise, Ai = 0. In this paper, we
seek to answer the following questions: Can we establish a
theoretical lower bound on the robustness of a DNN model
against MIA attacks by analyzing the mutual information of
its inputs and outputs?
Key Observation: As shown in Section 5, the observed
correlations between the MIA success probability and the
mutual information metric are 0.966, 0.996, and 0.955 for
CIFAR-10, GTSRB, and SVHN data sets. The fact that these
correlations are close to unity suggests that we can compute
the mutual information between input and output/activations
of a model to estimate its susceptibility to MIA attacks.
Extension of Fano’s Inequality: Given a DNN model N ,
the success probability pα of a membership inference attack
algorithm that considers all inputs from a data set D making
more than α prediction errors is
pα ≥
H(D)− I(D;Y)− 1− log ((|D|0 )+...(|D|α ))
|D| − log ((|D|0 )+...(|D|α ))
Here, H(D) is the entropy of the training data set D,
|D| denotes the size of the total data set available to the
MIA algorithm, and I(D;Y) denotes the mutual information
between the training data D and the neural network out-
puts/activations Y. Since typically DNNs are deterministic
functions, we add small noise to the DNN weights to com-
pute this mutual information (Achille, Paolini, and Soatto
2019). Only the mutual information term I(D;Y) depends
on the DNN model, and hence, we can compute I(D;Y)
to determine the robustness of the model - the higher the
I(D;Y), the lower the robustness to MIA attacks.
3 Theoretical Bounds on MIA Success using
Extension of Fano’s Inequality
The supervised training of a DNN modelN uses the dataset
D with inputs Di and corresponding labels Y ci . The prob-
abilistic output of the DNN model on the data set D is de-
noted by Y. A MIA method relies on feeding inputsD′i from
a data set D ⊇ D to the trained DNN model to obtain its
probabilistic prediction (softmax layer output) Yi. This is, in
turn, fed to the MIA model which makes a prediction Ai of
whether the data input D′i is present in D. The ground truth
of whether D′i is present in D is denoted by Xi. The error
ξ of the attack model is given by ξ =
∑
i 1(Xi 6= Ai),
where 1 is the indicator function. For a threshold α, we
can define an indicator random variable Eα that has the
value 1 when ξ > α and 0 otherwise. We use the notation
pα = Pr(Eα = 1) to denote the probability of the event
Eα.
Fano’s Inequality
We briefly recall a classical result from information theory,
Fano’s inequality, that establishes a relationship between the
average information lost in a noisy channel and the proba-
bility of the categorization error (Fano 1961).
Let XF represent the input to a noisy channel being ana-
lyzed by Fano’s inequality, and YF represent the correspond-
ing output on this channel. Further, let P (xF , yF ) denote the
joint probability of the input and the output for this noisy
channel.
Suppose the random variable eF represents the occur-
rence of an error in the noisy channel, i.e., the approximate
recovered signal X˜F = f(YF ) is not the same as the input
signal. Formally, eF corresponds to the event XF 6= X˜F .
We denote the support of the random variable XF by the
notation XF .
Fano’s inequality establishes a fundamental information-
theoretic relationship between the conditional information
H(XF |YF ) and the probability of error P (eF ) in a noisy
channel:
H(XF |YF ) ≤ H(eF ) + P (eF ) log(|XF | − 1) (1)
Our mathematical results in this paper are an extension of
Fano’s inequality that relate the probability of error of a
membership inference attack with the mutual information
between the inputs and outputs/activations of a neural net-
work.
Extension of Fano’s Inequality to MIA Success
We theoretically establish a relationship between the proba-
bility of a MIA model making α prediction errors on a neural
networkN and the mutual information I(D;Y) between the
inputsD and the outputs/activations Y of the neural network
N . Our proof procedure first establishes two lemmas on the
conditional entropy H(Eα, X|A), and then uses these re-
sults to prove a theorem relating MIA prediction errors with
the mutual information I(D;Y). Our proof of the bound on
pα is applicable to any classifier with input D and output Y,
not just to a neural network.
Lemma 1.
H(Eα, X|A) = H(X|A)
Proof. Since the error Eα is deterministically known given
X and A, the entropy H(Eα|X,A) = 0. We can evaluate
H(Eα, X|A) using the chain rule of conditional entropy.
H(Eα, X|A) = H(X|A) +H(Eα|X,A) (2)
= H(X|A) + 0
= H(X|A) (3)
Lemma 2.
H(Eα, X|A) ≤ 1 + (1− pα) log
(
(|D|0 )+···+(|D|α )
)
+ pα|D|
Proof. We perform an expansion for H(Eα, X|A) using the
chain rule of conditional entropy:
H(Eα, X|A) = H(Eα|A) +H(X|Eα, A) (4)
Now, we know that H(Eα|A) ≤ H(Eα) as conditional en-
tropy is no more than an unconditional entropy. Further,
since Eα is a binary valued random variable, H(Eα) ≤ 1
by the definition of entropy. Thus, we can write Eqn. 4 as
follows:
H(Eα, X|A) ≤ 1 +H(X|Eα, A) (5)
We can expand the second term H(X|Eα, A) by splitting
Eα into two cases i.e. Eα = 0 and Eα = 1:
H(X|Eα, A) = Pr(Eα = 0)H(X|Eα = 0, A)
+ Pr(Eα = 1)H(X|Eα = 1, A) (6)
We can simplify the above expression by obtaining bounds
on the quantity H(X|Eα = 0, A). If Eα = 0, the ran-
dom variable X can only differ from the random variable
A in at most α positions. Thus, given a particular value of
the random variable A, the random variable X can only
take at most
(|D|
0
)
+ · · ·+ (|D|α ) = V (α) values. The high-
est entropy is achieved when all these values are equally
likely i.e. H(X|Eα = 0, A) ≤ −
∑V (α)
j=1
1
V (α) log
1
V (α) =
− log 1V (α)
∑V (α)
j=1
1
V (α) = − log 1V (α) = log V (α). Hence,
Eqn. 6 can be rewritten as:
H(X|Eα, A) ≤ (1− pα) log
(
(|D|0 )+···+(|D|α )
)
+ pα H(X|Eα = 1, A) (7)
In the above equation, we have used pα as a shorthand to
represent the probability Pr(Eα = 1). Since X can take at
most 2|D| different values, the term H(X|Eα = 1, A) on
the right can be upper bounded by log 2|D| = |D| using the
definition of entropy. Thus, Eqn. 7 can be simplified as:
H(X|Eα, A) ≤ (1− pα) log
(
(|D|0 )+···+(|D|α )
)
+ pα|D|
(8)
Putting together equations 5 and 8, we get the following:
H(Eα, X|A) ≤ 1 + (1− pα) log
(
(|D|0 )+...(
|D|
α )
)
+ pα|D|
(9)
Theorem 1. Given a neural network N and a MIA model
that considers all inputs from a data setD and only observes
the outputs/activations Y of the neural networkN , the prob-
ability of such a MIA model making more than α prediction
errors is
pα ≥
H(D)− I(D;Y)− 1− log ((|D|0 )+...(|D|α ))
|D| − log ((|D|0 )+...(|D|α ))
Here, H(D) is the entropy of the training data setD, |D| de-
notes the size of the total data set available to the MIA, and
I(D;Y) denotes the mutual information between the training
data D and the outputs/activations Y of the neural network.
Proof. Putting together the results from Lemma 1 and
Lemma 2, we obtain the following:
H(X|A) ≤ 1 + (1− pα) log
(
(|D|0 )+···+(|D|α )
)
+ pα|D|
=⇒ pα ≥
H(X|A)− 1− log ((|D|0 )+···+(|D|α ))
|D| − log ((|D|0 )+···+(|D|α )) (10)
Note that X is determined given the training data D used
to train the neural network N ; hence, H(X|D,A) = 0.
Thus, using the chain rule of conditional entropy, we get
H(D,X|A) = H(D|A) + H(X|D,A) = H(D|A) +
0 = H(D|A) Also, repeating the chain rule of conditional
entropy, we get H(D,X|A) = H(X|A) + H(D|X,A).
Combining these two results, we obtain the following:
H(X|A) = H(D|A) − H(D|X,A). Putting this together
with Eqn. 10, we obtain the following:
pα ≥
H(D|A)−H(D|X,A)− 1− log ((|D|0 )+···+(|D|α ))
|D| − log ((|D|0 )+···+(|D|α ))
≥ H(D)− I(D;A)−H(D|X,A)− 1− log
(
(|D|0 )+···+(|D|α )
)
|D| − log ((|D|0 )+...(|D|α ))
as I(D;A) = H(D)−H(D|A)
≥ H(D)− I(D;A)− 1− log
(
(|D|0 )+···+(|D|α )
)
|D| − log ((|D|0 )+···+(|D|α ))
since, H(D|X,A) = 0 (11)
Also, since Y is obtained from D by using the neural net-
work N , and the adversarial prediction A is obtained
from the neural network response Y, the data processing
inequality implies that I(D;A) ≤ I(D;Y). Applying these
results to Eqn. 11, we get the following:
pα ≥
H(D)− I(D;Y)− 1− log ((|D|0 )+···+(|D|α ))
|D| − log ((|D|0 )+···+(|D|α )) (12)
The training of a neural network does not influence the
entropy of the training data set H(D) or the size of the
complete data set D used by the membership inference at-
tack. Our analysis shows that the probability of a member-
ship inference attack making more than α prediction errors
is dependent on the mutual information I(D;Y) between
the inputs and the outputs/activations of a neural network.
Thus, the mutual information between the inputs and the
outputs/activations of a neural network can be used to char-
acterize its susceptibility to membership inference attacks.
Example 1 (Theorem 1 with I(D;Y) = 0, α = c where c
is a constant such that c << |D|, and H(D) = |D|). Con-
sider an untrained neural network such that the mutual in-
formation between its input D and its output Y is zero. Fur-
ther, assume that H(D) = |D|. Then, Theorem 1 states that
the probability pα of a membership inference attack making
more than c prediction errors is:
pα ≥
H(D)− I(D;Y)− 1− log ((|D|0 )+···+(|D|c ))
|D| − log ((|D|0 )+···+(|D|c ))
≥ |D| − 1− log
(
(|D|0 )+···+(|D|c )
)
|D| − log ((|D|0 )+···+(|D|c ))
Since, I(D;Y) = 0 and H(D) = |D|
≥ 1− 1|D| − log ((|D|0 )+···+(|D|c ))
As the data set becomes large i.e. |D| → ∞, pα → 1
for α = c << |D| i.e. the membership inference attack will
almost surely make at least c prediction errors if I(D;Y) =
0 and H(D) = |D|.
Example 1 shows how the probability bound established
by Theorem 1 ties with our intuition in a specific setting of
a poorly trained neural network with I(D;Y) = 0. Now,
we look at another example of a neural network where
I(D,Y) = |D|/c for some constant c > 1.
Example 2 (Theorem 1 with I(D;Y) = |D|/c for some
constant c > 1, α = 0, and H(D) = |D|). Consider
a neural network whose mutual information is given by
I(D;Y) = |D|/c. Applying Theorem 1, the probability of
making one or more prediction errors is:
pα ≥
H(D)− I(D;Y)− 1− log ((|D|0 ))
|D| − log ((|D|0 ))
≥ |D| −
|D|
c − 1
|D| Since, I(D;Y) =
|D|
c
and H(D) = |D|
≥ 1− 1
c
− 1|D|
Thus, according to Theorem 1, a membership inference at-
tack may make at least one prediction error with probability
1− 1c as |D| → ∞ .
Measuring Mutual Information: Entropy of any d di-
mensional random variable x can be computed using a non-
parametric estimator (Gao, Ver Steeg, and Galstyan 2015)
based on k-nearest-neighbors (kNN) with a correction ap-
plied for the local non-uniformity of the underlying joint
distribution of the d features. A simple kNN based esti-
mator for entropy from samples x1, x2, . . . , xn is: H(x) =
− 1n
∑n
1 log pk(x
i) where the probability density is given by
pk(x
i) = kn−1
Γ(d/2+1)
pid/2
rk(x
i)−d. Here, rk(xi) is the dis-
tance between xi and its kth nearest neighbor in the data
set. This can be used to compute the entropy of training
data H(D), H(Y), and H(D,Y). The empirical estimation
of the mutual information between the training inputs and
outputs/activations of a DNN model I(D;Y) is obtained as
I(D;Y) = H(D) +H(Y)−H(D,Y).
4 Related Work
We survey related work in membership inference attacks and
discuss privacy preserving approaches to machine learning.
We sketch the relationship between regularization, mutual
information and generalization in deep neural networks.
Membership Inference Attacks
A membership inference attack on neural networks essen-
tially generalizes the well-studied problem of identifying if
a specific data record is present in a data set given some
statistic about this data set (Shokri et al. 2017; Nasr, Shokri,
and Houmansadr 2019; Jacobs et al. 2009; Sankararaman
et al. 2009). This is a severe privacy concern. For example,
membership in the training data set of a model associated
with an addiction or disease can reveal otherwise private in-
formation about the patient (Liu et al. 2019; Pyrgelis, Tron-
coso, and Cristofaro 2017). A number of MIA methods have
been proposed recently in literature. One approach (Shokri
et al. 2017) trains a number of shadow models independently
using a subset of the training dataset. The final attacker
model learns from all these shadow models, and can then
predict if a data element was in or out of the target model’s
training data. Another training-time attack is based on aug-
menting the training data with additional synthetic inputs
whose labels encode information that the model needs to
leak (Song, Ristenpart, and Shmatikov 2017). No other com-
ponent of the entire training pipeline is perturbed. Yet an-
other approach (Melis et al. 2019) exploits the fact that deep
neural networks construct multiple internal representations
of all kinds of features related to the input data, including
those irrelevant to the current task. These attacks have also
been extended to collaborative and federated settings (Melis
et al. 2019). Robust learning techniques to defend against
adversarial attacks have been shown to increase susceptibil-
ity to MIA attacks (Song, Shokri, and Mittal 2019). Finally,
these attacks have also been shown to be largely transfer-
able (Truex et al. 2018). These observations further under-
line the need for addressing MIA attacks.
Privacy Preserving Machine Learning
Differential privacy is used for privacy-preserving statisti-
cal analysis over sensitive data where the privacy and utility
trade-off is controlled by a privacy budget parameter. Differ-
ential privacy can provide formal guarantees that the model
trained on a given dataset will produce statistically similar
predictions as a model trained on a different dataset that
differs by exactly one instance (Dwork, Roth et al. 2014).
Differential training privacy has been proposed as a way
to measure model susceptibility by computing this worst-
case difference among all training data points (Long, Bind-
schaedler, and Gunter 2017). These are particularly use-
ful for simple convex machine learning algorithms (Chaud-
huri, Monteleoni, and Sarwate 2011; Zhang, Rubinstein, and
Dimitrakakis 2016; Jayaraman et al. 2018). But differen-
tial private deep learning often requires a large privacy bud-
get (Shokri and Shmatikov 2015) with ongoing efforts to re-
duce it (Abadi et al. 2016; Hynes, Cheng, and Song 2018).
Differential privacy methods can provide worst-case bounds
on the privacy loss, but these do not provide an understand-
ing of privacy attacks in practice. Membership and attribute
inference attacks, on the other hand, provide an empirical
lower bound on the privacy loss of training data. The rela-
tionship between the standard worst-case definition of dif-
ferential privacy and the average-case mutual-information
notion is an active area of study in the security and pri-
vacy literature (Cuff and Yu 2016; Wang, Ying, and Zhang
2016). Further, MIA attacks are a restricted form of privacy
attacks that do not aim at discovering the training data but
only detecting the presence of a given data in the training
set. In contrast to the differential privacy bounds, we focus
entirely on MIA attacks and formulate an information theo-
retic bound on the probability of such an attack being suc-
cessful instead of characterizing worst-case privacy leakage.
This allows a scalable and practical approach to measure
and regulate the average-case susceptibility of DNN mod-
els to existing MIA attacks. In order to make DNN models
more robust to privacy attacks, there are broadly two classes
of techniques. The first relies on adding noise directly to the
training inputs (Zhang, He, and Lee 2018), or to the stochas-
tic gradient descent (Abadi et al. 2016) to control the affects
of the training data on the model parameters. The second
class uses an aggregation of teacher ensembles (Dwork and
Feldman 2018; Papernot et al. 2018; Pyrgelis, Troncoso, and
Cristofaro 2017), where privacy is enforced by training each
teacher on a separate subset of training data, and relying on
the noisy aggregation of the teachers’ responses.
Generalization and Memorization in DNNs
A desirable property of any model is having low general-
ization error, that is, good performance on unseen exam-
ples from the population. The connection between overfit-
ting and membership inference attacks has also been inves-
tigated (Yeom et al. 2018). Regularization techniques aimed
at controlling model complexity have been traditionally used
to reduce overfitting and improve generalization. But recent
work has demonstrated that these regularization techniques
do not reduce the susceptibility to MIA attack (Long et al.
2018). In contrast, we use mutual information to character-
ize susceptibility of DNNs to MIA attacks. One explana-
tion of generalization in deep learning states that training
initially increases the mutual information between the input
and the output of the model, and then decreases the mutual
information removing relations irrelevant to the task and im-
proving generalization (Shwartz-Ziv and Tishby 2017). A
related effort focuses on the ability of a deep learning model
to unintentionally memorize unique or rare sequences in the
training data (Carlini et al. 2018), and uses it to measure the
model’s propensity for leaking training data. Prior work has
shown that deep learning models can be trained to perfectly
fit completely random data (Zhang et al. 2016) which in-
dicates high memorization capacity of DNNs. Hence, MIA
attacks are not an oddity of a particular learning technique or
model, but a result of the widely observed memorization in
deep learning models. Our approach of characterizing MIA
susceptibility of models to these attacks to mutual informa-
tion is, thus, a first step in a promising direction that connects
privacy and generalization of DNNs.
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Figure 2: Mutual information between the inputs and the output layers of a neural network correlates strongly with the success
probability of membership inference attack models. The Pearson correlations between mutual information and success proba-
bility of a contemporary MIA attack (Shokri and Shmatikov 2015) are 0.966, 0.996 and 0.955 for neural networks trained on
the CIFAR-10, GTSRB and SVHN data sets, respectively. Our evaluation considers three different variants of the MIA attack.
5 Experimental Results
Our experiments are performed on a system with 128GB
RAM, a 16-core AMD processor, and 2 NVIDIA RTX 2080
Ti GPUs running Ubuntu 20.04. Three popular data sets are
used for our investigations: (i) CIFAR-10 (Krizhevsky, Nair,
and Hinton 2014) (ii) SVHN (Netzer et al. 2011) and (iii)
GTSB (Houben et al. 2013). In our experimental evaluation,
we investigate whether we can use mutual information be-
tween the input and output of a DNN model to estimate the
success probability of MIA attacks on the model.
CIFAR-10: We study 4 DNN models for the CIFAR-
10 data set with mutual information decreasing from 2.01
to 1.17 nats. Using three different variants of a contem-
porary membership inference attack (Nasr, Shokri, and
Houmansadr 2019) with 3, 5 and 7 shadow models, the prob-
ability of attacks decreases from 0.82 to 0.59, 0.82 to 0.62,
and 0.83 to 0.65, for the three attacks respectively. A de-
crease in mutual information is coupled with a decrease in
the success probability of the MIA model. The Pearson cor-
relation between the mutual information and the attack prob-
ability for CIFAR-10 is 0.966.
GTSRB: The GTSRB data is also used to train four dif-
ferent neural network models with mutual information de-
creasing from 2.29 to 1.21. As shown in Fig. 2, the success
probability of the most powerful MIA model falls from 0.98
to 0.46.
SVHN: Similar reduction in the success of MIA models is
observed on the SVHN data set. As the mutual information
falls from 1.09 to 0.40, the probability of success of the most
successful MIA model falls from 0.98 to 0.47.
We find that the Pearson correlations between mutual in-
formation and success probability of a contemporary MIA
attack (Nasr, Shokri, and Houmansadr 2019) are 0.966,
0.996 and 0.955 for neural networks trained on the CIFAR-
10, GTSRB and SVHN data sets, respectively. The strongly
positive Pearson’s correlation across data sets confirms our
theoretical finding that mutual information is related to the
success probability of MIA models.
Figure 3: The approximate lower bound (LB) on pα is positive only when H(D|Y) exceeds a threshold (left) and z(α) =
log
(
(|D|0 )+···+(|D|α )
)
/|D| exceeds another threshold (right).
Broader Applicability of Our Lower Bound
While Theorem 1 enables a theoretical understanding of
the relationship between mutual information I(D;Y), in this
section, we investigate an orthogonal question: when does
Theorem 1 produce positive lower bounds on pα?
Figure 3 (left) shows a plot of a threshold on the ratio of
the conditional entropy H(D|Y) and the size of the data set
|D| such that conditional entropy values higher than this ap-
proximate threshold are required for a positive lower bounds
for pα in Theorem 1. We can verify that the results agree
with our intuition for various values of the ratio of the num-
ber of errors α to the size of the data set |D|. For example,
if we are only interested in small number of errors α < |D|4 ,
our lower bounds on pα are positive when H(D|Y) > |D|2
i.e. the conditional entropy H(D|Y) is comparable to at least
half the size of the data set |D|.
On the other hand, as the size of the data set increases and
the number of errors becomes large e.g. α/|D| ≈ 0.5, the
curves corresponding to the threshold show that the condi-
tional entropy H(D|Y) needs to become as large as about
71% of |D| for our lower bound to produce a positive result.
This again makes intuitive sense as the conditional entropy
must be high in order for even the best membership infer-
ence attack to suffer a large number of errors.
The bound in Theorem 1 can also be stated as pα ≥
1 − 1+1/|D|−c1−z(α) , where c = H(D|Y)|D| and z(α) =
log ((|D|0 )+···+(|D|α ))
|D| . Figure 3 (right) shows how the value of
z(α) required for a positive lower bound changes with the
ratio α/|D| in one setting.
In summary, our lower bound on pα is useful in a
large non-degenerate regime where the conditional entropy
H(D|Y) is not too low when compared to the size of the
data set |D|. If the conditional entropy H(D|Y) is too low,
our bound is not positive and this ties well with our intuition
that a good adversary can launch embarrassingly successful
membership inference attacks in this setting.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
Fano’s inequality is a classical information theoretic result
that relates the probability of an error in a channel with
the conditional entropy between the input and output of a
noisy channel. We present a new extension to Fano’s in-
equality (Fano 1961) that establishes a bound on the success
probability of a membership inference attack using mutual
information between the inputs and the outputs/activations
of a DNN model. We mathematically prove that our mutual
information based bound can measure a DNN model’s sus-
ceptibility to any membership attack.
In our empirical evaluation, the correlation between the
mutual information and the susceptibility of the DNN model
to membership inference attacks is 0.966, 0.996, and 0.955
for CIFAR-10, SVHN and GTSRB, respectively. Thus, we
address the challenge of making DNNs less susceptible to
membership inference attacks and reduce the risk of inad-
vertent leak of information about training data.
Several directions for future research remain open. While
this paper focuses on the use of mutual information as a sus-
ceptibility metric another interesting line of research may
focus on computing pα directly as a metric of susceptibility
to membership inference attacks. Since mutual information
I(D;Y) is the only term in the lower bound of Theorem 1
that arises from the design and training of the neural net-
work, we have chosen to focus on mutual information as a
susceptibility metric.
Because of recent advances in neural network based es-
timation of mutual information, our results on I(D;Y) as
a metric can be used to create an effective regularization
approach for training neural networks that are more robust
against membership inference attacks.
Another interesting direction of research is a deeper un-
derstanding of the tightness of our bound based on mu-
tual information. While we have presented experimental ev-
idence on three different data sets to show that mutual infor-
mation is a good metric for measuring model susceptibility
to membership inference attacks, a theoretical investigation
into the tightness of the bound may lead to deeper insights.
Ethical and Broader Impact
There is an emerging trend of providing DNN models to
users either directly or through cloud services, where the
model has been trained on proprietary or private data. The
recently proposed membership inference attacks show that
the user of the model can infer whether a training data was
used in a model or not. MIA attacks violate the expected pri-
vacy of the individual participants contributing to the train-
ing data, and cause unauthorized leakage of the training
dataset which could be of business value or even a trade se-
cret. For example, membership in the training data set of a
model associated with a disease or addiction can reveal oth-
erwise private information about a patient. As yet another
example, consider an anomaly detection DNN model for an
engine made available to customers by the engine manufac-
turer, the discovery of training data employed for anomaly
detection could leak crucial proprietary information. These
concerns create a hurdle to the broader adoption of DNN
models.
We address this socially important challenge in the paper.
We present a way to analyze a machine learning model to
understand its susceptibility to membership inference attack
using mutual information between the inputs and the out-
puts of the model. Our approach will make machine learn-
ing models more robust and privacy-aware, and thus, be of
positive impact to society.
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